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Botanical Plant Patent Law
Edward A. Hayman*
T HE TOWNSEND-PURNELL Plant Patent Act of 19301 was the
first attempt anywhere in the world to legally recognize
the plant breeder as an inventor entitled to the protection of
patent laws.2 Plant patents and plant patent applications so
seldom have been the subject of judicial consideration through-
out the intervening years that plant patent law is still in need
of clarification in a great many areas.
Purpose
The amendment of 1930 increased the number of potential
patentees to include anyone who "invented or discovered and
asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant,
other than a tuber-propagated plant." The purpose of the
amendment was to provide to those engaged in agriculture or
horticulture the same opportunity to participate in the benefits
of the patent system as was previously given to industry.3
Asexual Reproduction
It will be noted that the statute refers to the invention or
discovery of a variety of plant and insists that the inventor or
discoverer asexually reproduce it. Variety is the lowest cate-
gory in botanical classification, and every plant, in a sense, may
be considered a variety in that it has its own individual char-
acteristics, usually too insignificant to be of any practical im-
portance.4 On rare occasions, however, a plant or a part of a
plant will manifest new and unique characteristics of such use-
fulness or beauty as to make it desirable to preserve them.
* Graduate, Cleveland Institute of Art; pre-law training at John Carroll
University; Patent draftsman and patent law trainee with office of Meyer,
Baldwin, Doran & Egan of Cleveland; Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 The Plant Patent Act, 46 Stat. 376, amending R. S. 4886, 35 U. S. C. Sec.
31 (1930).
2 Allyn, The First Plant Patents 10 (1934).
3 For a comprehensive discussion of the purpose and intent of Congress,
see the reports of the Patent Committees, H. R. Rep. No. 1129 or S. Rep.
No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930).
4 Seidman & Horwitz, Patent Office Rules and Practice, Sec. 160.1 (1959).
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Seedlings from such plants or parts of plants cannot be relied
upon to reproduce the new characteristics, 5 and the only de-
pendable means of preserving the new variety is to resort to
one of several well-known methods of asexual reproduction such
as cutting, layering, grafting, or the like. In cutting, a stem or
twig is detached from the new variety and planted in the earth.
Layering involves bending down an undetached living branch
of the plant and covering it with earth. For the purpose of
grafting, a detached stem or scion is attached to another living
plant called the "stock." ' Asexual reproduction results in a
new plant having characteristics which are substantially identi-
cal with the characteristics of the plant or part of a plant from
which it came, and the new plant may itself be asexually re-
produced to provide other identical plants. As long as there is
one plant of the new variety to begin with, it may be multiplied
almost indefinitely.7
Patentable Distinctions
The distinctive characteristics which make a new variety of
plant patentable may manifest themselves in the outward ap-
pearance of the plant or they may not even be apparent to the
viewer. In determining a question of infringement, one court
noted the differences in color between the fruit and pit cavities
of two allegedly distinct varieties, the differences in the size and
shape of the fruit and pits, and the differences in the shape, color,
and glands of the leaves.8 But a patent was granted by the Pat-
ent Office for a new variety of rose which was identical in ap-
pearance with a known variety wherein the sole distinction of
the new plant was its everblooming characteristic. 9
Department of Agriculture
Applications for plant patents may be submitted by the Pat-
ent Office to the Department of Agriculture for study and to
obtain a report as to whether or not, in the opinion of the De-
partment, the application is for a new and distinct variety of
5 Magnuson, A Short Discussion on Various Aspects of Plant Patents, 30 J.
Pat. Off. Soc'y 493, 496 (1948).
6 Seidman & Horwitz, op. cit. supra note 4.
7 Cook, The Administration of the Plant Patent Law From the Breeder's
Point of View, 15 J. Pat Off. Soc'y 275, 279 (1933).
8 Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 167 F. Supp. 665, 669-70 (S. D. Cal. N. D. 1958),
affd. 276 F. 2d 259 (9th Cir. 1960).
9 Rossman, Plant Patent No. 1, 13 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 521 (1931).
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plant. 1° One writer has expressed the opinion that the Patent
Office practice has been to grant a patent whenever the Depart-
ment of Agriculture gives a favorable opinion as to novelty
without further regard to any yardstick of improvement or dis-
tinction.11 However, the Department's report is actually merely
advisory in nature and does not even constitute a part of the of-
ficial record of the application.12 This is borne out in Ex parte
Rosenberg13 where an appeal was taken to the Board of Ap-
peals from a rejection of a claim. The ground of rejection was
evidence of prior knowledge and use found in the Department
of Agriculture's reports. It was not made clear whether or not
the matters reported were as to facts within the personal knowl-
edge of the official making the report. In reversing the rejec-
tion, the board pointed out that a Patent Office examiner may
rely upon matters of knowledge as to the prior existence of a
thing if such knowledge is personal to an employee of the
Office and is supported by affidavit. The board concluded that
the rule as to employees of the Department of Agriculture could
be no more lax than that for employees of the Patent Office, and
in the absence of an affidavit supporting the alleged knowledge,
the ground for rejection was untenable. 14
The case of the everblooming rose, referred to above, in-
volved another situation in which an adverse opinion was re-
ceived from the Department of Agriculture. During the prose-
cution of Plant Patent No. 1, granted to Henry F. Rosenberg
and covering a climbing rose, the Department reported that the
subject plant was substantially identical with an established va-
riety known as "Dr. Van Fleet." The applicant filed affidavits
supporting the fact that although the plant was identical in ap-
pearance with the Dr. Van Fleet, it differed by its everbloom-
ing characteristic, having flowers continuously throughout the
summer and fall. The Patent Office suggested that the appli-
cant amend his claim to define this everblooming habit and
thereafter allowed the patent to pass to issue.15
10 Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, Rule 167 (June 1960), on authority
of Executive Order No. 5464, October 17, 1930, Facilitating the Considera-
tion of Applications for Plant Patents, pursuant to the Act of May 23, 1930,
Public L. No. 245 (now 35 U. S. C. Sec. 164).
11 Allyn, Patentable Yardsticks, 25 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 791, 816 (1943).
12 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, Sec. 1609 (3rd ed. 1961).
13 46 U. S. P. Q. 393 (P. 0. Bd. App. 1939).
14 Id. at 394-95.
15 Rossman, supra note 9.
Sept., 1962
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Scope of a Plant Patent
Early writers on plant patent law differed widely as to its
worth and meaning and particularly as to just what a plant pat-
ent was supposed to cover. 1 The rule is now well settled that
a plant patent covers the entire plant and not a part thereof,17
notwithstanding the fact that some early plant patents bore the
title of the fruit or flower only of the patented variety. In Ex
parte Van Over,ls the applicant attempted to get multiple claims
in a plant patent, including method claims. He argued that
different parts of the plant had different uses and that he was
entitled to claims for the different parts. In refusing the multiple
claims, the board said that a plant patent is to the variety and,
therefore, to the whole plant. The board further reasoned that
the statutes say nothing about methods or arts in connection
with plant patents and held that method claims are improper in
a plant patent. The inevitable conclusion reached from this
case was that only one claim can be allowed in a plant patent and
it must not be a method claim.
The statute grants to the plant patentee the right to ex-
clude others from asexually reproducing the plant or selling or
using a plant so reproduced. 19 The question was early discussed
as to whether or not a plant which is substantially identical with
a patented plant but which was separately developed and asex-
ually reproduced is an infringement of the patent. The exact
question, in those terms, seems not to have been decided, but
the reasoning of the cases and the view of some writers supports
the conclusion that there would be no infringement under these
circumstances.20 Therefore, it would seem that a plant patent
only protects the clones or, in other words, the asexual progeny
of a particular plant.
If the above conclusion is correct, then a plant patentee may
not only exclude all others from reproducing, selling, or using
the new variety but he may never be excluded from reproduc-
16 In 15 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y (1933), Allyn, Plant Patent Queries at 180 and
Cook, The Administration of the Plant Patent Law From the Breeder's
Point of View at 275, answered by Robb, Plant Patents at 752.
17 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, op. cit. supra note 12 at 1605.
18 24 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 293 (1942) (P. 0. Bd. App. 1941).
19 35 'L. S. C. Sec. 163.
20 Robb, supra note 16; Cook, The First Plant Patent Decision, 19 J. Pat.
Off. Soc'y 187 (1937); Langrock, Plant Patents-Biological Necessities in
Infringement Suits, 41 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 787 (1959).
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ing, selling, or using the plant himself. In other words, there
can be no such thing as a dominating or basic plant patent which
could operate to prevent a subsequent plant patentee from prac-
ticing his own invention, a situation which is quite common in
the field of mechanical patents.
What Constitutes Invention
Since plant variation is, in a very real sense, a more or less
accidental phenomena of nature, the question of what constitutes
invention of a new variety of plant is particularly interesting.
The statute uses both the term invents and discovers.21 As one
court pointed out, as cultivation cannot cause a variation, inven-
tion must be in the discovery of a new variety. But the inventor
cannot discover the plant until he is certain that it actually is a
new variety, and the only test possible is to asexually reproduce
it and thereby prove that it is a new variety. Therefore, con-
ception or discovery of the invention must be concurrent with
actual reduction to practice or the asexual reproduction of the
plant.22
In Ex parte Foster,2 3 an appeal to the Board of Appeals was
taken from a rejection on the ground that the variety of plant
sought to be patented is found in nature. The applicant was a
professional plant cultivator and an expert on plant propagation
and hybridization. He traveled extensively in search of new va-
rieties, and on one trip found two small and different syngonium
plants in a downtown garden in Barranquilla, Columbia, South
America. Applicant obtained the plants, took them to Florida,
decided that they were a new variety, and asexually reproduced
them. The Board considered the question to be so important that
it was decided by a larger board than the customary three. The
rejection by the examiner was affirmed and the rule of the case
appears to be that a plant which is merely found in nature, even
though in a cultivated area, is not patentable. The Board held
that the words "invented or discovered" and "new" mean the
same whether applied to plant patents or to patents covering
other statutory classes of patentable subject matter,24 and ap-
parently felt that these plants had previously existed in nature
21 35 U. S. C. Sec. 163.
22 Dunn v. Ragin, 50 U. S. P. Q. 472, 475 (P. 0. Bd. Inter. Exam. 1941).
23 90 U. S. P. Q. 16 (P. 0. Bd. App. 1951).
24 Id. at 17.
Sept., 1962
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and could not, therefore, be discovered within the meaning of
the plant patent statute.
Another ground for rejection was put forth by the examiner
in Ex parte Moore,25 but the situation was quite similar to the
Foster case. The application of Moore had been rejected during
prosecution solely on the ground that he was not the original,
first, and sole inventor or discoverer of a new variety of peach
tree. The facts were that in 1918 one Miller built a house and
the following year he noticed a small peach tree growing in the
yard. It lived 12 years and bore large, luscious peaches. Miller
had no idea that it was a new variety. In 1928 the applicant,
Moore, saw the tree and recognized it as a new variety. With
Miller's permission, he took ten scions from the tree and grafted
them on native root stock and asexually reproduced several suc-
cessive generations from the original tree. The examiner took
the position that "discovers" means "finds" and that Miller dis-
covered the tree. The applicant argued that Miller did not find
a new variety of tree as he had no appreciation that it actually
was a new variety. Also, Miller did not asexually reproduce the
tree while Moore did. The Board of Appeals held that Moore
was the discoverer within the meaning of the statute and, there-
fore, was entitled to a patent.
The Foster and Moore cases are not readily reconciled al-
though the fact that in Foster two of the new plants were found
may be considered as of some significance. If two of them existed,
the inference could be drawn that the variety existed in nature
and the fact that it could be asexually reproduced was of no
significance, but the Board did not make this point. The 1954
amendment to 35 U. S. C. 161 had the declared purpose of clarify-
ing the intent of Congress that a grower of plants who through
no particular efforts other than by accident develops a new plant
which is nevertheless "due to his activity" should be entitled to
a patent as though he had deliberately planned the result
achieved. 26 It will be noted that the Foster case was decided
before the amendment, and the Moore case was decided after-
wards. However, it is difficult to see how the new variety in
Moore was brought into existence "due to his activity" to any
greater extent than the mere find in Foster.
25 115 U. S. P. Q. 145 (P. o. Bd. App. 1957).
26 Act of Sept. 3, 1954, 68 Stat. 1190, amending 35 U. S. C. Sec. 161.
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Reduction to Practice
It can be stated definitely that invention as applied to plant
patents comprises the same two inventive acts which are required
in other patents: conception and reduction to practice. -7 Concep-
tion is the recognition that a new variety exists, and reduction to
practice consists of asexual reproduction of the new variety.
Constructive reduction to practice by the mere filing of a patent
application, although permitted and quite common with me-
chanical inventions, is not available to the plant patent applicant.
The problem of reduction to practice was pertinent to the
issue in Dunn v. Ragin.2 That case involved a three-way inter-
ference and related to a new variety of seedless orange tree
which originated as a mutation or bud variation, commonly called
a bud sport, on a pineapple orange tree growing in a cultivated
orange grove in Florida. All parties had propagated trees from
the bud variation, and all parties had filed patent applications.
The sole question before the Board was that of priority.
The facts of the Dunn case were that an employee from an
adjoining grove discovered a seedless orange growing on a tree
in a grove belonging to Dunn. Dunn was informed of the dis-
covery, and upon examining the tree found that one limb bore
seedless oranges while the rest of the tree bore heavily seeded
fruit. In 1937 Dunn told Carlile of the discovery and asked him
to asexually reproduce the new variety. Later, Dunn sold the
tree and all rights thereto to Carlile. Carlile cut budwood from
the tree and budded it to root stock and by 1938 the new trees
bore fruit. However, Carlile filed for a patent in 1937 before
success was actually determined.
Much earlier, in 1934, Dunn had given Ragin permission to
cut budwood in his grove from any tree he chose. Ragin found
the new variety, obtained some of the budwood, and had success-
fully reproduced the new plant by 1936. The application of
Carlile was placed in interference with an application by Ragin,
and Dunn, apparently learning of the interference from Carlile,
filed his own application.
Dunn took the position that he first discovered the plant
and had Carlile reduce it to practice for him. Ragin contended
that mere knowledge did not constitute discovery as referred to
27 Dunn v. Ragin, supra note 22 at 474.
28 Id,
Sept., 1962
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in the plant statute and that Carlile was not Dunn's agent. Car-
lile, as assignee of Dunn, took no position.
The Board awarded priority to Ragan who had discovered
the plant in 1934 and had asexually reproduced it in 1936. Car-
lile's application was declared to be invalid because he had not
asexually reproduced the tree before filing a patent application.
As for Dunn, the Board reasoned that even if it were assumed
that Carlile was the agent of Dunn, the latter had both a filing
date and a reduction date later than those of Ragin, and Dunn
had lost any rights he might have had by his lack of diligence.
In its discussion of the subject of reduction to practice, the
Board in the Dunn case pointed out that the ordinary means of
reduction is to either build the machine or perform the art or do
whatever is necessary to prove the invention. However, one may
effect a constructive reduction to practice by filing a patent
application on the theory that this completes the invention by
making it (when a patent issues) available to the public. But
the mere filing of a plant patent application and obtaining a
patent therefor would not enable anyone to reproduce the plant,
because to do so the plant must be in existence. Therefore, filing
of a plant patent application cannot be a constructive reduction
to practice.2 9
Joint Inventors
There can be joint inventors in a plant patent. Two cases
bring this out very clearly: Ex parte Kluis30 and Bourne v.
Jones.31
In the Kluis case, an appeal was taken to the Board of Ap-
peals from a rejection of the application on the ground that the
oath was not sufficient. Two oaths had been filed, saying in effect
that one party had invented or discovered the new plant and the
other party had asexually reproduced it. The Board said that,
lacking precedent, analogies must be drawn from the law on
mechanical patents. The plant patent statute requires the aver-
ment of two distinct acts: invention or discovery and asexual
reproduction. But the statute does not require that at all times
and for all purposes both parties be in the presence of each other
29 Id.
30 70 U. S. P. Q. 165 (P. 0. Bd. App. 1945).
31 114 F. Supp. 413 (S. D. Fla. 1951), affd. 207 F. 2d 173 (5th Cir. 1953),
cert. den., 346 U. S. 897 (1953).
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at each stage of development or that they jointly perform every
act.32 The rejection was reversed.
The facts in the Bourne case evolved from a program carried
on by the State of Florida wherein an attempt was being made
to find a sugar cane variety which would be inherently immune
to a prevalent sugar cane disease. Bourne acted as a breeder
and Stevens carried on the agronomic aspects of the experiments.
Bourne obtained a patent and brought an infringement suit
against the defendant. On these facts, the court held that Bourne
and Stevens were joint inventors and that the patent was invalid
because it was issued to only one of them.
33
Bars to a Plant Patent
The effective bars to the issuance of a plant patent are appar-
ently no different than those for mechanical patents insofar as
they are applicable to plant patents.3 4 Lack of novelty will
bar a plant patent3 5 as well as public use in excess of the statu-
tory period for public use.30 Additionally, tuber propagated
plants or plants found in an uncultivated state are barred by
statute.
37
The condition in 35 U. S. C. Sec. 102 (a), that an invention
which was known or used by others in this country before the
invention thereof by the applicant cannot be patented, was the
primary defense of the defendant in Nicholson v. Bailey.38 Plain-
tiff sued for infringement of Plant Patent No. 625 covering a
seedless navel orange tree producing "Dream Navels." Plaintiff
had discovered the new variety in 1939 in a small citrus grove
planted with mixed varieties, and only one tree had the charac-
teristics of the patented plant. This parent tree was twenty-five
to thirty years old and was a budded tree of undetermined root
stock. Plaintiff cut some budwood from the parent tree and
asexually reproduced it. A patent issued in 1944.
The defendant's position was that since the tree had been
32 70 U. S. P. Q. at 166.
33 114 F. Supp. at 418.
34 Ex parte Rosenberg, supra note 13 at 394; 35 U. S. C. Sec. 101, 102, 103.
35 Ex parte Foster, supra note 23.
36 Cole Nursery Co. v. Youdath Perennial Gardens, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 159
(N. D. Ohio, E. D. 1936), appeal dism., 101 F. 2d 1007 (1939), settlement be-
tween parties; Bourne v. Jones, supra note 31 at 420.
37 35 U. S. C. Sec. 161.
38 182 F. Supp. 509 (S. D. Fla. 1960).
Sept., 1962
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asexually reproduced twenty-five to thirty years before its dis-
covery by the plaintiff, it must have been known or used within
the meaning of the statute and, therefore, the patent was invalid.
But the court reasoned that although the tree actually was
asexually reproduced, there was no evidence that anyone appre-
ciated that it was a new variety. The court held that the mere
existence in an orange grove of a tree which had been asexually
reproduced so many years before the patent issued did not by
itself act to overcome the presumption of validity attaching to
the issuance of a patent.39 The patent was held to be valid and
infringed.
The Plant Patent Act added plants to the statutory classes of
patentable subject matter. What the term "plant" embraces was
questioned in In re Arzberger.40 An application for a plant pat-
ent covering a bacteria had been rejected by the examiner, and
the applicant appealed to the Board of Appeals. The bacteria
was cultured from Louisiana cane field soil and was useful in
soil cultivation. Reproduction of the bacteria was asexual. The
issue raised was whether or not bacteria are plants within the
meaning of the statute.
While refusing a patent to the applicant, the court conceded
that bacteria are usually scientifically classified as plants. How-
ever, the court noted that in the House and Sentate commitee
reports4 1 it states that the new bill provides for an inventor or
discoverer the exclusive right to propagate the new plant by
asexual reproduction and defines asexual reproduction as by
grafting, budding, cuttings, layering, division, and the like. Bac-
teria are not reproduced by any of these methods, and this is a
strong indication of the character of plants intended to be em-
braced by the legislation. The court concluded that the word
"plant" was used by the Congress in its popular sense and not
in its scientific sense.
4 2
Infringement
Any use of a patented plant which does not directly or in-
directly involve asexual reproduction cannot be deemed an in-
fringement of the patent.4 3 As the patent covers the entire plant
39 Id. at 511.
40 27 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1315, 112 F. 2d 834 (1940).
41 Supra note 3.
42 27 C. C. P. A. at 1318-20.
43 Langrock, supra note 20 at 787.
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and not a part thereof, the sale of fruit from a patented tree is
not an infringement of the plant patent any more than the sale
of the product of a process patent is an infringement of that
patent.44 Also, no inference of infringement arises from the pre-
sumption of validity of a patent. 45
In Armstrong Nurseries, Inc. v. Smith,46 three defendants
were charged with infringement of certain patents covering new
varieties of roses. The defendant Dyess furnished budwood from
the patented plants, and the defendant Smith budded and culti-
vated the roses. Dyess had also entered into an agreement with
Hood whereby Hood also budded the infringing roses. Hood was
apparently innocent of any willful wrongdoing as Dyess had
represented to him that the plants were new, unpatented va-
rieties.
Dyess was held to be guilty of infringement for furnishing
the budwood and actively inducing others to infringe. He was
also adjudged a contributory infringer in aiding and abetting
the sale of the infringing roses. Smith was guilty of infringement
for asexually reproducing the roses. Hood was likewise held to
have infringed even though he had no knowledge that he was
doing so at the time. Except for the purpose of increasing dam-
ages when the infringement is willful, knowledge or intent is
not material. 47
The statutory requirement of notice to an infringer 48 was
satisfied as to a plant patent when the plaintiff, at the time of
sale of a patented plant to the defendant, told the defendant that
it was patented and that he could not asexually reproduce or
sell the trees without the plaintiff's permission. 49
One who charges infringement of a patent has the burden of
proving it.50 This rule creates a particular hardship for the
plaintiff owner of a plant patent. One writer argues that the
burden should be shifted to the defendant in the case of plant
inventions. He points out that, on the one hand, asexually re-
produced plants can vary in a minor way from environmental in-
44 Robb, supra note 16 at 758.
45 Kim Bros. v. Hagler, supra note 8, at 668. The presumption of validity
of a patent is statutory, 35 U. S. C. Sec. 282.
46 170 F. Supp. 519 (E. D. Texas 1958).
47 Kim Bros. v. Hagler, supra note 8, at 668.
48 35 U. S. C. Sec. 287.
49 Kim Bros. v. Hagler, supra note 8.
60 Id. at 668.
Sept., 1962
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fluences alone while, on the other hand, it is possible to develop
an almost identical plant by other means than asexually repro-
ducing the patented plant. The burden on the patentee, to show
some actual physical appropriation from the patented plant, is
nearly impossible for him to support. The suggestion is that
the presumption should be that where the patentee shows that
the allegedly infringing plants are substantially the same as the
patented plant and that the defendant had at least a minimum
opportunity to make an actual physical appropriation, the de-
fendant be held to have infringed and the burden be on him
to show that he independently reproduced the plants. It is
pointed out that the defendant is in a superior position as to
knowledge of how he reproduced the plants and can easily show
his innocence.5 1
Extension of Monopoly
An interesting footnote to plant patent law is found in Dixie
Rose Nursery v. Coe.52 This case was an appeal from the District
Court's refusal to authorize the Commissioner of Patents to reg-
ister appellant's trade-mark for rose plants, scions, and cuttings.
The trade-mark comprised the words "Texas Centennial" on an
outline map of Texas. Appellant already had a patent on the
variety of rose sold under the trade-mark, and he marketed the
rose himself or licensed others to do so. The Patent Office re-
fused registration on the ground that it was the name of a variety
of rose and, therefore, merely descriptive. Appellant admitted
that the variety was well-known and was commonly called for
by the trade-mark name.
In upholding the judgment against the appellant, the court
pointed out that the Patent Office and the District Court could
conclude from the facts that the trade-mark name was so widely
used to identify a particular type of rose as to have lost its sig-
nificance as pertaining specifically to appellant's rose. It had
thus become merely descriptive of a rose and not of a particular
product. The court reasoned that if appellant were allowed to
have this trade-mark registered, it would have the effect of ex-
tending his monopoly beyond the time granted by the patent,
as buyers would be forced to ask for a trade name when all they
really wanted was a particular variety of rose. This would
make it difficult for a newcomer to break into the field after
51 Langrock, supra note 20, at 788-90.
52 131 F. 2d 446 (D. C. Cir. 1942), cert. den., 318 U S. 782 (1943).
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the patent monopoly had expired. The court concluded that
where words sought to be registered as a trade-mark, though
originally arbitrary, have come to describe to the public a par-
ticular thing and not the source of that thing, the applicant is
not entitled to registration. 53
Summary
Features characteristic of plant patents and plant patent
law may be summarized in the following statements.
(1) A plant patent covers the entire plant and not a part
thereof.
(2) Only one claim can be allowed in a plant patent and it
must not be a method claim.
(3) There can be no such thing as a dominating or basic
plant patent.
(4) Conception or discovery of a plant invention must be
concurrent with actual reduction to practice of the invention.
(5) A new variety of plant, found by a person in nature
and not brought into existence due to his activity, is not pat-
entable.
(6) There can be no such thing as a constructive reduction
to practice of a plant invention.
(7) A plant patent, obtained on an application filed before
success is actually determined by asexual reproduction, even
though success is subsequently determined, is invalid.
(8) There can be joint inventors in a plant patent.
(9) The mere discovery of a new variety of plant, in the
absence of any appreciation that it actually is a new variety,
is not conception or discovery of the invention.
(10) Bacteria are not patentable under the plant patent
statutes.
(11) The word "plant" in the statutes is used in its popular
sense and not its scientific sense.
(12) Any use of a patented plant which does not directly
or indirectly involve asexual reproduction is not an infringement
of the patent.
(13) One who furnishes material for asexually reproducing
a patented plant is an infringer of the patent.
53 Id. at 447.
Sept., 1962
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